By Bill Carey
On Aug. 18, 2007, FDNY Firefighters Robert Beddia and Joe Graffagnino became trapped during a fire on the 17th floor of the Deutsche Bank Building, which was under deconstruction. The building’s standpipe was disconnected, and asbestos abatement partitions blocked water access to the fire.
After an hour on the scene, fire companies were able to supply water via an exterior hoseline. Shortly after, the two firefighters, who were assigned to Engine Company 24 on the second alarm, ran out of air and became disoriented while attempting to find their way out. Both issued maydays and suffered severe smoke inhalation. When they were found, they were transported to a hospital, where they later died.
The NIOSH report highlights several contributing factors in the deaths of the two firefighters as well as recommendations for fire departments.
The building
At the time, the Deutsche Bank Building was located at 130 Liberty St., across from the site where the World Trade Center towers once stood, as well as the quarters of Engine Company 10 and Ladder Company 10.
The building had been heavily damaged on Sept. 11, 2001, when a 24-story gash was torn into its north façade by collapsing nearby structures. Left abandoned, it became contaminated with mold, asbestos, dioxin, lead, silica, polyaromatic hydrocarbons and human remains.
Deconstruction
The building was undergoing asbestos abatement and deconstruction. At the time of the fire, the building had been reduced to 26 stories. Scaffolding with a black-mesh enclosure had been set up around the building to contain falling debris. The original elevators were removed, and two external construction elevators were installed on the A and C sides, each with dual cars for transporting workers and materials. During the fire, only the A-side elevator was used to transport firefighters.
Each stairwell had 6-inch standpipe risers from sub-level B to the top floor, but the system was compromised. Sections of the standpipe in sub-level A were missing, preventing water supply from any fire department connection (FDC). The A-side FDC was removed due to damage. Firefighters connected to the B-, C-, and D-side FDCs, but water leaked into sub-level A through the missing pipe sections. The A-stairwell standpipe was intact, but the hose outlets were removed or capped. The B-stairwell standpipe was disabled, and the system had been modified for limited construction use. Both fire pumps were out of service during the fire.
Engine Company 24 firefighters
As Engine 24 firefighters advanced the hoseline from the 14th to the 15th floor, Rescue 2 was finishing their search. A Rescue 2 firefighter stationed at the stairwell was ordered to descend to the 14th floor in zero visibility, passing at least one Engine 24 firefighter. Firefighter Beddia was on the nozzle at the 15th-floor doorway when the Engine 24 officer began searching for the fire. His low-air alarm activated, and he returned to the stairwell, informing a firefighter he was low on air and descending. Disoriented on the landing, he issued a mayday, then managed to exit to the 14th floor.
After the Engine 24 officer left the 15th floor, Firefighter Beddia and the backup firefighter decided to move the hoseline down to the 14th floor. There, they found Firefighter Graffagnino gasping for air. Firefighter Graffagnino, out of air and standing despite heavy smoke, attempted to buddy breathe with the backup firefighter, but couldn’t due to not wearing his facepiece. The backup firefighter, struggling to reattach his regulator, tried to pull Firefighter Graffagnino down, but lost his grip and fell through the 14th-floor doorway. He found a hose leading to the construction elevator and called for Firefighters Beddia and Graffagnino to follow and transmitted a mayday, reporting that two members were out of air on the 14th floor. He exited to the Q-decking area and informed others that two Engine 24 firefighters were still inside.
Firefighters located
Firefighters near the 14th floor Q-decking area were exhausted, likely due to heavy smoke and limited SCBA use. The Engine 24 firefighter informed his officer about the situation. The Rescue 1 officer, a Rescue 1 firefighter, and the Rescue Battalion Chief entered through a breach in the plywood wall to search for the missing firefighters. After moving about 15 feet, the Rescue 1 officer heard a PASS alarm. The battalion chief returned to get more help. Firefighter Graffagnino was found unconscious without his facepiece. CPR was initiated and he was taken down the elevator.
The Rescue 1 officer ensured everyone had evacuated before returning to the Q-decking area. Upon arrival, the Engine 3 officer informed him that another firefighter was missing. They heard another PASS alarm and followed a search rope. The Engine 3 officer found Firefighter Beddia unconscious without his facepiece near the elevator shafts. Beddia was brought to the Q-decking area, where CPR was initiated before he was taken down the elevator.
On the ground, firefighters continued CPR and rushed both victims to ambulances. They were transported to a trauma center, where Beddia and Graffagnino were pronounced dead.
Fire behavior
According to the NIOSH report, several significant factors related to the fire’s uncontrolled spread:
- Fire began on the 17th floor, C-side in the decontamination shower area.
- Window and plywood coverings, C-side, were self-venting 15 minutes after arrival.
- Ventilation of 14th and 15th floors, B- and C-sides, occurred early in operations.
- Excessive reflex time – water supply was not established for over 1 hour into operations.
- External fire extended laterally from the 17th floor downward.
- Smoke conditions changed dramatically when the fire on the 15th floor escalated.
- Firefighters described unusual smoke conditions as a “wall of smoke” descending on them.
- Smoke conditions were dark black and fuel-rich.
- Numerous compartmentalized zones were under negative pressure for asbestos abatement.
- Plastic sheeting, construction debris and exposed lumber in partitions provided additional fuel.
Contributing factors
NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately led to the fatalities:
- Delayed notification of the fire by building construction personnel
- Standpipe and sprinkler system inoperable
- Delay in establishing water supply
- Inaccurate information about standpipe
- Unique building conditions with both asbestos abatement and deconstruction occurring simultaneously
- Extreme fire behavior
- Uncontrolled fire rapidly progressing and extending below the fire floor
- Blocked stairwells preventing fire fighter access and egress
- Maze-like interior conditions from partitions and construction debris
- Heavy smoke conditions causing numerous fire fighters to become lost or disoriented
- Failure of firefighters to always don SCBAs inside the structure and replenish air cylinders
- Communications overwhelmed with numerous mayday and urgent radio transmissions
- Lack of crew integrity
Honoring the fallen
In 2013, a plaque was dedicated to Firefighters Beddia and Graffagnino at the quarters of Engine Company 10 and Ladder Company 10, next to the World Trade Center Tribute Wall and across the street from where the fire occurred.
“We’re here to make sure that despite the passage of time, no one forgets what happened here six years ago,” then-Fire Commissioner Salvatore Cassano said. “We are forever grateful for their service.”