We don’t hear the term conflagration all that often in the fire service, at least not outside the wildland setting, but a conflagration can be any large fire that causes a lot of damage. And on Oct. 14, 1973, the conditions in a small Massachusetts city were right for just such an event.
About Chelsea and its fire department
Situated across the Mystic River from Boston and measuring just under 2½ square miles, Chelsea is the smallest city in the state. According to the 1970 census, the urban and industrial city was home to roughly 30,000 residents. As with many Northeastern communities, the land was first settled in colonial times. This meant that the streets were narrow, and buildings stood close together.
The seminal America Burning report was published in May 1973, detailing the major problem of fires in the nation at that time. Like so many communities, Chelsea was burning. Through the 1960s and into the early-1970s, it was not uncommon for the Chelsea Fire Department to respond to multiple fires in a day. In fact, the 1968 NFPA Annual Survey reported that Chelsea had more building fires per 1,000 residents than any other city surveyed. This was no small feat for a department of its size. The city was protected by 101 firefighters and officers assigned to five engine companies and two ladder companies in four firehouses. At any given time, 23 or more firefighters and officers were on duty.
Red flags in the Rag Shop District
Nestled along the railroad tracks and behind the then-U.S. Naval Hospital was a section of town informally known as the Rag Shop District, so named for its concentration of materials recyclers and salvage yards. These salvors dealt with ordinary combustibles ranging from tires to textiles.
Many of the metal-clad, wood-framed buildings were in poor condition and contained various combustible items. Outside the buildings, the salvage yards were brimming with inventory piled several feet high and in various forms of disarray. Furthermore, in the fall of 1973, the price of recycled rubber was low, and many recyclers were holding onto their tire inventory with the hopes that prices would go back up. In addition to the scrap and salvage storage in the district, there was an ongoing issue of trash accumulation.
Not only were there commercial properties, but also several single-family residences and two-and three-story wood-framed apartment buildings in the Rag Shop District.
Ironically, Chelsea’s salvage industry had been seeded by Boston’s prohibition of such businesses. Following the Great Boston Fire of 1872, textile recyclers were banned from operating there to prevent another conflagration in that city; as such, many of those businesses relocated to Chelsea.
On April 12, 1908, a fire broke out in Chelsea’s Rag Shop District and spread across the city, killing 19 people and destroying 3,500 buildings. Following that fire, the city was rebuilt and much of the Rag Shop District was reconstructed just as it had been pre-fire.
Sounding the alarm
Firefighting had advanced in the decades since 1908, but the city’s water supply was so poor that several months prior to the 1973 fire, the city’s fire chief, Herbert Fothergill, warned of the city’s fire risk, citing that over 90 of the city’s hydrants either lacked sufficient pressure or were completely inoperable. This warning was followed a month later by a report from the National Board of Fire Underwriters, citing Chelsea as having “the highest potential for conflagration of any city in the U.S.A.”
Chief Fothergill was acutely aware of the fire risk and had taken action to address it. Chelsea’s pumpers were equipped with 4-inch and 4½-inch supply hose, fitted with Storz couplings. This advancement came decades before large-diameter hose was commonplace in the American fire service. The department also used portable hydrants to reduce friction loss and trained regularly on water relay operations. The fire prevention bureau was sparsely staffed, with just one deputy chief and one inspector. Nonetheless, the department had begun conducting regular building inspections for fire safety earlier in the year.
Through the 1960s, Chelsea’s Rag Shop District experienced significant decline, and a portion of it was slated for urban renewal. The mayor had been successful in securing funding and commissioning a redevelopment authority to manage the project. The plan was to redevelop the Rag Shop District into an industrial park, and included such measures as wider streets and larger setbacks as well as the use of noncombustible (Type II or better) construction. The infrastructure was also to be updated, improving the water supply. Unfortunately, this project wouldn’t start soon enough.
Conflagration begins
The weather in Chelsea had been dry for several weeks, and on the afternoon of Sunday, Oct. 14, there was a 38-mph westerly wind with gusts as high as 50 mph blowing across the city from Boston Harbor. That, coupled with cluttered, unkempt conditions and an inadequate water system, led to the perfect conditions for a conflagration.
At 3:56 p.m., Box 215 was transmitted for a building fire at 122 Summer St., just 200 feet from the origin of the 1908 fire. The initial assignment sent three engine companies, one ladder company, and a deputy chief to the scene. When the first engine arrived just 1 minute later, the officer reported a working fire. Moments later, the officer reported that the fire had already spread to neighboring buildings and had crossed Summer Street.
The deputy chief arrived and transmitted a second alarm, but before that alarm could be struck, he requested a third alarm, depleting the in-city resources.
The fire chief responded from home and arrived almost immediately after the initial assignment. He transmitted a fourth alarm, bringing in multiple companies from neighboring towns and cities.
Full-scale response efforts
The firefight was initiated with master streams and deck guns. Firefighters used the water supply techniques they had trained on, but the water supply was insufficient. The stiff wind from the harbor accelerated fire growth and spread, forcing crews to retreat and regroup several times as additional structures ignited.
Mutual-aid assignments had been written clearly for incidents reaching fourth-alarm status. Chief Fothergill realized that he needed additional resources after the fourth alarm was fulfilled, so he requested 20 more engine companies to respond. After requesting the 20 additional engines, Fothergill announced that there was a conflagration and ordered incoming apparatus to stage at fire department headquarters. It is believed that this was the first time in history that the term “conflagration” was transmitted over a two-way radio. Eventually, the fire chief would request “all available assistance” to respond. This brought fire apparatus from across Massachusetts. As firefighters were deployed into the scene, they worked as part of an integrated force.
Early ICS connections
Coincidentally, the FIRESCOPE team was in the early stages of developing what would eventually become the Incident Command System (ICS). Beginning with establishing a command presence and managing effective communications, Chief Fothergill and other city leaders managed this incident using many techniques that would later become foundational in the system. The fire chief was in control of all firefighting resources on scene, and the police chief handled law enforcement resources and operations.
Another example of ICS foreshadowing was the decision to have apparatus respond to fire department headquarters and await further orders instead of coming directly to the scene. This use of what would later be known as level 2 staging allowed the fire chief to manage resources and maintain command and control over the incident.
The initial command post was one block from the fire’s origin but was relocated twice throughout the incident due to rapid fire spread. Command was established by the on-duty deputy chief and was transferred to subsequent chiefs as the incident expanded. Although the deputy chiefs maintained command over the scene, the fire chief was ultimately in control of the incident. In today’s terms, we are careful not to blur the lines of who is in charge of an incident, but in Chelsea in 1973, it was understood that the fire chief had the ultimate authority and that the deputy chiefs would operate under that authority.
Incident management at all levels
As block after block was consumed by the wind-driven fire, it became apparent that more police resources would be needed to assist in evacuating residents, to prevent looting, control crowds and minimize traffic, allowing for safe and effective resource deployment. An order was issued to close all roads into the city, and the lower level of the Tobin Bridge was designated for emergency vehicle traffic only. Police officers from the surrounding area as well as State Troopers responded to assist in securing the city. National Guard members were also mobilized to support the operation.
The fire chief was managing the incident from the ground and attempted to observe as much as he could of the scene, but that soon became impossible due to the sheer size of the fire. Arrangements were made for the chief to direct operations from a helicopter. This was pivotal because it allowed the chief to see the big picture and develop a strategy to bring the fire under control. The same could be accomplished today using a drone.
Fire officers were assigned to oversee different areas of the fire, and the fire chief would communicate with them by radio so that they could issue the appropriate orders to the companies at their disposal. This is a great example of how the use of divisions can be instrumental in managing span of control and continuity of operations.
Fire spread challenges
Generally, when we think of fire spread in structural firefighting, we are focused on direct exposure to adjacent buildings through radiation and direct flame impingement. In addition to traditional fire spread, flying brands and debris from a conflagration ignite spot fires separate from the main body of fire. These brands are carried by wind and by convection currents generated by the fire itself. As the fire intensified, the draft generated by combustion was so great that it blew trash and debris through the streets, contributing further to the fire spread.
In terms of fire control and extinguishment, a conflagration is handled using concepts generally employed in wildland firefighting. The IC must look beyond what is burning and focus on preserving the unburned. Firefighters had attempted to hold the fire to the block of origin but were quickly overrun. Another attempt was made to hold the fire at Everett Avenue and Fourth Street, but the fire continued to spread.
Most of the fire spread was wind-driven, so the chief knew where the fire was headed and needed to choose fire breaks along the perimeter. A railroad bed ran along the north edge of the Rag Shop District. This right-of-way was wide enough for six tracks, although there were only four still in use with the remainder of the space being a roadbed. This was chosen as a fire break and companies were deployed to hold the fire in check from there.
Fire spread to the west was less of a challenge as the wind was blowing the fire away from that direction, and firefighters were able to prevent extension beyond Second Street. As the fire spread to the east, it reached Arlington Street, which was wider than the others in the area, and firefighters were able to hold the fire in check before it could spread to a nearby school.
In the evening, a shift in wind direction from westerly to northwesterly affected the fire’s behavior. It continued to spread until it reached the intersections of Everett Avenue with Summer, Third and Elm streets. The wind was beginning to subside and some buildings in this section were separated by vacant lots. Those factors slowed the fire’s progression so that firefighters could better control the fire.
Under control
From his vantage point in the helicopter, the fire chief was also able to identify spot fires and order resources to respond to them.
Throughout the incident, 80 fires outside the conflagration perimeter were extinguished. As spot fires were discovered either by the fire chief or citizens, fire companies were dispatched from the staging area at fire headquarters. Early detection and an abundance of available resources allowed for quick extinguishment and helped minimize damage.
The main body of fire was contained at 9:15 p.m., just over five hours after it had begun. Spot fires continued throughout the night, with one of them growing to become a second-alarm fire at City Hall. Mutual-aid companies began arriving back in their cities around midnight.
The fire wasn’t declared extinguished until Oct. 17, over 70 hours after the box was pulled.
War zone
On that first daybreak on Oct. 15, the city resembled a war zone. The fire had consumed everything in its path, leaving behind 18 blocks of scorched earth. The fire destroyed about 300 buildings and several vehicles, including fire apparatus and the fire chief’s personal car. Damage from the fire amounted to $1.8 million, which did not include the loss of the city barn. The city was declared a disaster area and federal aid was made available almost immediately.
There were no fatalities, but approximately 60 people were injured. Over 1,000 residents were left homeless and were assisted by local churches, the Red Cross and other civic groups.
The response included 99 fire departments, with 847 firefighters responding on 165 engine companies, 26 ladder companies and 33 other units. Some of these resources were used to backfill fire stations left vacant by the response, but most responded to the scene.
What worked
There were many factors leading to the relative success of this operation. The fire chief effectively maintained command and control throughout the incident. The state mutual-aid plan provided a template for rapid deployment of resources in an organized fashion. That, coupled with resource management in the form of staging areas, simplified resource management and accountability.
While communications were complicated due to the limitations of the radio system at the time, personnel were able to work through that challenge by using face-to-face communications, then relay messages across two-way radios.
The decision to utilize a helicopter for assessment, observation and command proved invaluable. While an incident commander can be effective without having a personal view of the incident, operations went far more smoothly once the chief was airborne. This practice could be implemented today using a drone with a video feed to the command post.
Furthermore, resources that responded included more than just engine and ladder companies. In addition to suppression units, 67 chiefs responded either to the scene or as part of cover assignments related to the fire. Many of these chiefs acted in a command-level capacity in various roles during the incident. This modular command structure helped maintain both span of control and accountability.
Final thoughts
Since 1973, Chelsea has changed quite a bit. The Rag Shop District no longer exists, having been replaced by a mix of commercial and industrial buildings and green space.
The former Fire Station 5 was spared by firefighters that day and is now a fire department-themed restaurant that stands as a reminder of the conflagration. Prior to this fire, a major conflagration had not occurred in a United States city since 1936, and such events are even less common now – but still a threat to some communities.
In 2017, the Tubbs fire killed 22 people and destroyed over 5,000 structures in a wildland-urban interface conflagration in Northern California. It is imperative that fire departments work to enforce fire codes, maintain preplans, obtain necessary resources for target hazards, and train regularly with their mutual-aid partners.
While devastating, the story of the Chelsea conflagration is one of success. Hundreds of firefighters worked together to ensure that no lives were lost, and the main fire was contained in about five hours – and that’s why you’ve never heard of it.
