The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health is encouraging fire departments to have standard low-frequency, high-risk strategies as well as more in-depth air-management training. This comes after a N.C. fire captain died when he ran out of air fighting a high-rise fire.
Capt. Jeffrey Bowen, 37, a 13-year veteran of the Asheville Fire Department, died while trying to find the seat of an arson fire in a six-story medical building. Nine other firefighters were also injured.
Captain Bowen and his fellow firefighters were fighting a large fire on the top floors when emergency crews had trouble getting water flow.
As smoke filled the upper floors, Capt. Bowen noticed two firefighters trying to untangle a hose on a stairwell; one of them was running low on air. He told the firefighter to leave and instead of leaving through the stairwell with them, he proceeded down a hallway.
Two other firefighters followed Capt. Bowen, who was reportedly acting confused. When they hit the end of the hallway, all three of their SCBA low-air alarms went off; Capt. Bowen told one of his partners that he needed to buddy breathe.
The NIOSH report indicates that Capt. Bowen called a mayday but in the process of making his buddy breather connection, did not control the release of air and allowed all of the air from his partner’s SCBA to escape. The third firefighter became lost in the smoke, but escaped through a window.
A minute or two later, Capt. Bowen removed his facepiece after vomiting in it, then had his partner activate his PASS alarm. His partner attempted to drag Capt. Bowen down a stairwell, but both rolled down the steps and lost consciousness. Because Capt. Bowen’s PASS was still activated, a firefighter found them and tried to administer oxygen to them.
Both firefighters were taken to the hospital where Capt. Bowen was pronounced dead. An examiner’s report says he died from smoke and fume inhalation.
Following standard procedure
Not following the already existing standard operating procedures for a low-frequency, high-risk incident, like a high-rise fire, were contributing factors to Capt. Bowen’s death, according to the report.
Capt. Bowen’s fire department had an already developed SOG for dealing with a high-rise fire that was reviewed in 2011, but crews failed to follow it.
“Lobby control was never established and stairwell support for evacuation and fire-fighting operations were never established,” the report said.
Firefighters seemed unclear on what their role and accountability was in battling the flames, according to investigators.
In addition to following and developing standard procedure, NIOSH recommends that incident commanders are clear on an action plan that is clearly thought out and communicated to all firefighters involved.
This misstep may have proven to be one of the most fatal as crews did not foresee the water supply and flow issues that hampered Capt. Bowen’s escape from the building.
Lack of effective ventilation was also a key factor that may not have been properly executed as many firefighters reported getting lost and Capt. Bowen himself suffering from extreme smoke inhalation.
“A high-rise fire is completely different from a residential or other commercial structure fire in terms of strategy … Tactics must not only include the standard tactical assignments … but must also include ventilation, adequate staffing, water supply.” the report said.
Air management training
The investigation also determined that the firefighters, including Capt. Bowen, did not properly follow air-management protocol and were not adequately equipped to fight the high-rise fire.
Capt. Bowen exhausted all of his air early on and should have immediately left after his low-air alert came on. Although it is unclear if his confusion from the smoke inhalation affected his ability to escape, he and two other firefighters remained in the upper floors of the building even when all three were running very low on air.
“Firefighters should exit from an immediately dangerous to life or health atmosphere before the consumption of reserve air supply begins; a low-air alarm is … an immediate action item for the individual and firefighting team,” the report said.
However, even if Capt. Bowen had been able to escape once his low-air alarm came on, the incident commander had failed to provide a staging area floors below the fire to allow firefighters to rest and replenish their air supply as high-rise protocol recommends.
Investigators also encourage fire departments to do regular and repeated training in out-of-air SCBA emergencies and repetitive skills training. The training, the report says, is a preventative measure.
“The benefits of repetitive skill training with SCBA are an increased comfort, and competency level, decreased anxiety, lower air consumption, and increased awareness,” the report said.
Long-term training can also concrete certain vital motions into muscle memory.
Investigators say that when Capt. Bowen and his partner tried to connect for buddy breathing, he likely forgot to activate his doff button, allowing his partner’s air to escape.
Building regulations
While protocol may have contributed to Capt. Bowen’s death, the situation was aggravated by the fact that the medical building did not have a sprinkler or fire suppression system installed.
Investigators say that if a building is properly equipped, the safety risks for firefighters are greatly reduced, if not eliminated.
NIOSH says states and municipalities should adopt and enforce regulations that make fire suppression systems standard.